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INTRODUCTION
COURTS UNDER PRESSURE:
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND RULE OF LAW
IN THE TRUMP ERA
JOHANNA KALBT

& ALICIA BANNON*

Since President Trump first took office, many of his most prominent
and divisive policies have landed in, and been blocked by, courts-from
the travel ban, to the transgender military ban, to efforts to defund
sanctuary cities. The President has responded by attacking the courts,
occasionally even taking to Twitter to personally denounce judges who
issue opinions that he dislikes.' For example, he responded to a district
court's rejection of the first travel ban by suggesting that judges should be
blamed in the event the United States experiences a terrorist attack. 2 He
also criticized the Ninth Circuit after its adverse decisions on the travel ban
and on his executive order withdrawing funding from so-called "sanctuary
cities," citing the circuit's "terrible record of being overturned (close to
80% )."13

f Fellow in the Democracy Program at the Brennan Center for Justice at New York
University School of Law and Professor of Law at Loyola University New Orleans College of
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I Deputy Director for Program Management in the Democracy Program at the Brennan
Center for Justice at New York University School of Law.
* We would like to thank Pichaya Winichakul, Marcelo Triana, and the New York University
Law Review for their assistance in developing this collection and to the authors for their
participation. Copyright © 2018 by Johanna Kalb and Alicia Bannon.
1 See In His Own Words: The President's Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE, https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/his-own-words-presidents-attacks-courts
(last
visited Mar. 29, 2018) (detailing President Trump's criticisms, in tweets and speeches, of courts).
2 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (Feb. 5, 2017, 12:39 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/828342202174668800 ("Just cannot believe a judge
would put our country in such peril. If something happens blame him and court system. People
pouring in. Bad!").
3 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 26, 2017, 3:36 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/857182179469774848. While it is true that seventynine percent of the cases reviewed by the Supreme Court were reversed in the period between
2010 and 2015, when considering the rate of reversal based on all cases decided by the circuit, the
reversal rate is below one percent. Lauren Carroll & Miriam Valverde, Does the Ninth Circuit
Have an Overturn Record 'Close to 80%'?, POLITIFACT (Apr. 26, 2017, 11:24 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2017/apr/26/donald-trump/does-ninth-circuithave-overturn-record-close-80/.
1
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These rhetorical attacks on the courts have been coupled with actions
signaling open disrespect for the rule of law. The President's refusal to
follow ethical guidance with respect to his business interests,4 his cheering
of police brutality,5 his attempts to discredit the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the Department of Justice, 6 and his decision to pardon
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who was convicted of contempt for failing to follow
court orders, have sent the message that the rules do not apply to the
powerful and that, in fact, our safety and security depend upon our
willingness to free our leaders from bothersome legal constraints.
To what extent do Trump's actions truly threaten the independence
and legitimacy of our courts-and what can be done to protect them? How
can and should judges and other institutional actors respond to a president
who flouts the processes and checks that normally constrain executive
power? The following essays, which resulted from a conference hosted by
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law,
offer a preliminary response to these questions. Collectively, they begin to
identify the structural underpinnings of independent courts and describe
strategies for bolstering them, both during the present moment and over
time.
As Aziz Huq explains, in the United States judicial independence is
supported more by convention than by law.8 Our courts lack the formal
structural protections that exist in some other national systems, making
them more vulnerable to political pressure and interference. 9 Moreover,
Tara Grove argues that many of these conventions, including the
expectation of official compliance with federal court orders, are of

4 See Jordan Fabian, FederalEthics Chief Blasts 'Meaningless'Trump Business Plan, HILL
(Jan. 11, 2017, 4:57 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/313864-government-ethicschief-blasts-trump-business-plan (noting that the head of the Office of Government Ethics
considered the future President's plan to separate himself from his business interests as
inadequate).
5 See Mark Berman, Trump Tells Police Not to Worry About Injuring Suspects During
Arrests, WASH. POST (July 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2017/07/28/trump-tells-police-not-to-worry-about-injuring-suspects-duringarrests/?utmterm=.4a8b4fe5817b (describing President Trump's request for police officers to
refrain from using their hands to prevent the heads of those in custody from hitting police
vehicles).
6 See Stephen Collinson & Jeremy Diamond, Trump Again at War with Deep State' Justice
Department, CNN (Jan. 2, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/02/politics/presidentdonald-trump-deep-state/index.html (contextualizing President Trump's open criticism of the FBI
and the Department of Justice).
7 See, e.g., Ryan Struyk, This Chart Shows Why Trump's Pardon of Arpaio Was So
Unusual, CNN (Aug. 30, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/29/politics/trump-pardon-arpaiochart-unusual/index.html.
8 Aziz Z. Huq, Democratic Erosion and the Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 21, 29-31
(2018).
9 Id.
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relatively recent vintage.10 Grove argues that this norm emerged following
and in response to the Civil Rights Movement; as Brown v. Board of
Education has become entrenched in American law and culture, both the
racism of the segregationists and their defiance of the courts were
discredited. 1 Thus far, the Trump administration has continued to comply
with court orders. Grove argues that institutional constraints within the
executive branch make this trend likely to continue. 12 By contrast, Shirin
Sinnar documents the ways in which many executive branch oversight
mechanisms, which help to check and prevent lawlessness in the executive
branch, depend on norms that are themselves under attack.13 In the
meantime, however, the President's flirtation with white nationalist rhetoric
and policies1 4 raises questions about whether our national commitment to
Brown's legacy, and, relatedly, our collective rejection of the lawlessness
of its opponents, will have the same universal appeal in coming years.
How should judges respond to this adversarial and unpredictable
President? At least in the travel ban cases, the lower courts have so far been
undeterred by Trump's rhetoric; judges from across the political spectrum
have rejected its various incarnations. 5 As Judge Nancy Gertner notes,
however, this outcome was far from inevitable, given the many doctrines
10 Tara Leigh Grove, The Power of "So-Called" Judges, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 14, 1517 (2018).
11 Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
12 Id. at 18-20.
13 See Shirin Sinnar, Internal Oversight and the Tenuous Protectionof Norms, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REv. ONLINE 61 (2018).
14 See, e.g., Josh Dawsey, Trump Derides Protections for Immigrants from Shithole'
Countries, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-attacksprotections-for-immigrants-from-shithole-countries-in-oval-office-meeting/201 8/01/1 1/bfc0725cf7 11-1 1e7-9 laf-3 lac729add94_story.html?utm term=.343dd48eal5f
(discussing
President
Trump's stated discontent with immigration from Haiti, El Salvador, and African countries, as
opposed to that from Norway and Asian countries); Glenn Thrush & Maggie Haberman, Trump
Gives White Supremacists an Unequivocal Boost, N.Y. TIES (Aug. 15, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-charlottesville-white-nationalists.html
("President Trump buoyed the white nationalist movement on Tuesday as no president has done
in generations.").
15 See Dahlia Lithwick & Steve Vladeck, Resisting the Myth of the Judicial Resistance,
SLATE (Jan. 25, 2018, 4:44 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/01/the-judges-whoveruled-against-trump-arent-part-of-some-judicial-resistance.html (arguing that there is no evidence
that judges who have ruled against Trump did so because of political motives); see generally,
e.g., Int'l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 605-06 (4th Cir.) (en banc),
vacated as moot, 138 S. Ct. 353 (2017) (finding that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged that the
travel ban was religiously motivated, but lifting the injunction against President Trump);
Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1156 (9th Cir.), reconsiderationen banc denied, 853 F.3d
933 (9th Cir.), and reconsideration en banc denied, 858 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. Golden v. Washington, 138 S. Ct. 448 (2017) (denying an emergency motion for stay of the
lower court order enjoining the travel ban); Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL
462040, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017) (granting a temporary restraining order that the State of
Washington and the State of Minnesota filed in response to the travel ban).
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that federal courts have developed to avoid conflict with the political
branches. 16 She worries that these doctrines, developed during "normal
times," have left the courts poorly equipped for this moment, requiring
courts to "duck, avoid, and evade" and thereby undermining their ability to
decide cases that protect democratic institutions and the rule of law. 17 But
she also suggests that judges may approach their role differently today, in
the face of real abuses of power.
Stephen Vladeck likewise applauds heightened skepticism by judges
of the exercise of government power. 19 He notes, however, that some
conservative commentators and academics have routinely characterized
judges as joining the "resistance" whenever they rule against the
administration; he argues that "skeptical" judging has a political valence,
raising difficult questions about whether there are objective standards for
determining when a judge has crossed a line. 2 0
Public critiques of "resistance" judges, together with Trump's more
direct attacks, may also pose a threat to public confidence in judicial
legitimacy. James Gibson and Michael Nelson's survey research indicates
that Trump's rhetoric has not diminished judicial legitimacy thus far. 21
They also found, however, that criticisms leveled by experts, alleging that
judges are behaving politically, may negatively impact public perceptions
of the courts. 2 2 David Fontana's essay provides further cause for concern,
warning that the large body of research showing strong and durable public
support for the U.S. Supreme Court may only be measuring what
Americans think about the Court in the abstract, when the actual stakes of
its decisions are low. 2 3 He points out that we know far less about how
people respond "in the moment when passions are highest and
constitutional structures are most threatened." 24
The next several years are likely to provide ample data through which
to explore Fontana's concerns. The ongoing paralysis and polarization in
Congress means that significant policy decisions are increasingly being
16

Nancy Gertner, The "Lower" Federal Courts: Judging in a Time of Trump, 93 N.Y.U. L.

REV. ONLINE 7, 10-12 (2018).
17 Id.
18 Id. Notably, however, Huq offers a contrasting view, expressing skepticism that American
courts offer a real protection against democratic backsliding. See Huq, supra note 8, at 28-31.

19 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Aggressive Virtues, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 66, 67-68
(2018).
20
21

Id.
See Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has Trump Trumped the Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. ONLINE 32, 39 (2018) ("[O]ur results suggest that criticisms of the Court made by President
Trump are not associated with changes in support for the Court.").
22 Id.
23 David Fontana, How Do People Think About the Supreme Court when They Care?, 93

N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 50,53-54 (2018).
24 Id. at 54-55.
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kicked to the courts for resolution. In addition, Trump's disregard of many
of the conventions governing presidential behavior and Congress's
apparent inability to set meaningful limits on his conduct mean that the
courts will likely be asked to define the boundaries of presidential power in
many high stakes political disputes. This is a problem. As Andy Wright
explains, our constitutional system is heavily reliant on its actors operating
in "good faith." 25 As long as the party in power refuses to self-police, that
job will fall to the courts, potentially setting them up to be viewed by the
public as a partisan obstacle to the Republican agenda.
Over the long term, the best protection for both the independence and
legitimacy of the courts is in building their public support. This will mean
reminding political and other actors of the importance of their long-term
investment in the courts. As Keith Whittington explains, politicians on the
right (and left) have a long history of supporting the independent judiciary
as a check on majority power and have self-interested reasons to continue
doing so. 2 6
But accomplishing this task will also require a commitment to
building a judiciary that is more likely to engender public support-one
that is more representative, less beholden to special interests, and more
capable of providing meaningful access to justice in the matters that impact
people's lives. As David Lyle explains, in recent years, powerful special
interest groups have invested heavily in state judicial elections to intimidate
or replace judges who rule against them, and frustrated legislators have
worked to pack or crack courts that present an obstacle to political
agendas. 27 There is evidence that these pressures are impacting how judges
rule in cases-leading to harsher decisions in criminal cases 28 and to
decisions favoring wealthy special interest groups. 29 At the federal level,
courts have been hollowed out as Congress has limited their jurisdiction
over cases impacting vulnerable populations and as the courts themselves
25

See Andrew McCanse Wright, ConstitutionalGood Faith, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 41

(2018).
26 See Keith E. Whittington, The Bounded Independence of the American Courts, 93 N.Y.U.
L. REV. ONLINE 70, 72-74 (2018) (describing the "rise of a bipartisan commitment to judicial
independence").
27 See David Lyle, A Norm No More: Elected Officials' Lack of Deference to State Courts,
93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 55, 56-58 (2018) (discussing state level attacks on the judiciary).
28 See KATE BERRY, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, How JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IMPACT
CRIMINAL
CASES
7-11
(2015),
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/HowJudicialElectionsImpactC
riminalCases.pdf (discussing studies of judicial decision making in periods preceding elections
that conclude state court judges are less likely to rule in favor of criminal defendants when
threatened with future attack advertisements).
29 See Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 67071 (2009) (addressing the statistically significant benefits to interest groups that donated to
judges).
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have pushed an increasing number of people into private arbitration. 30 As a
result, courts are less accessible to resolve the judicial claims of everyday
litigants.
Put simply, if the public doesn't see the importance of courts in their
lives, they will be less likely to object to efforts to undermine them. And if
they don't see the importance of courts in their lives, then we have to ask
why-and an answer that focuses exclusively, or even primarily, on the
Trump administration misses the point.

&

30 See generally Judith Resnik, InterdependentFederal Judiciaries:Puzzling About Why
How to Value the Independence of Which Judges, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, 28, 40-44 (analyzing
factors affecting the scope of jurisdiction for federal judges).

